Blood and Money. On the Loyalty of the Seleucid Army

ELECTRUM Vol. 14 Kraków 2008 Peter Franz Mittag BLOOD AND MONEY. ON THE LOYALTY OF THE SELEUCID ARMY During the Hellenistic period the army was the basis of all kingdoms, as is demonstrated for example in the Suda: “It is neither descent nor legitimacy which gives monarchies to men, but the ability to command an army and to govern a state wisely, as was the case with the successors of Alexander” (Suda, s.v. basileia).1 The land each king ruled was regarded as “spear-won,” which meant that there was only one major argument in quarrels about claims on territory: the king himself or one of his forefathers conquered it.2 That explains why ten out of the fourteen Seleucid kings died in battle and the relationship between the king and his troops was of great importance. For the same reason it was no surprise that Seleucus III was murdered when it turned out that he was “sickly poor and unable to command the obedience of the army” (App. Syr. 66). The king had to provide enough money to pay his troops and he had to possess the ability to lead them to victory. Payment and obedience were closely linked but obedience was not just a question of payment. There were other factors too. While the discipline of the Seleucid army in a strict military sense was dealt with for example by Bar-Kochva3 I will focus on the more general obedience here. There are some quite detailed reports in ancient sources which enable us to get an idea of some major aspects und general developments. The obedience of the Seleucid army was especially in danger in times of wars between different members of the royal house and usurpators. During such moments the army or parts of it and especially its officers had to decide which side to support. I will start with Antiochus III because there is more detailed information from his reign than from those of his predecessors. 1. Antiochus III Antiochus III had to fight two usurpers at the beginning of his reign. Almost immediately after his accession in 223/2 Molon, the satrap of Media, revolted and proclaimed himself 1 2 See e.g. Gehrke 1982: 247–277; Chaniotis 2005: 57 ff. Mehl 1980/81: 173–212. 3 Bar-Kochva 1976: 96–102. 48 PETER FRANZ MITTAG king. A war between these two opponents was unavoidable. An important part of Molon’s soldiers seem to have supported Antiochus III as king. Molon had to play with wrong cards to cut these chains. To strengthen the ties between himself and his officers Molon sent “forged letters purporting to be from the king, and couched in threatening terms”.4 To pretend that Antiochus III would be angry with the soldiers under Molon’s command seemed to be an appropriate way of convincing these soldiers to stick to Molon’s side. But this was not as successful as Molon had intended. When Antiochus III sent Xenoitas, one of his friends, against Molon, parts of his army were still willing to change sides.5 In the meantime Antiochus III led a more or less unsuccessful campaign against the Ptolemies, which he had to end when news reached him that Xenoitas was beaten. In this situation the obedience of his army was at a turning point because the king was – like Seleucus III – not able to pay his troops. The most important of his friends, Hermeias, paid them out of his own purse. The result was that nearly all troops again declared their loyalty to Antiochus, except 6,000 soldiers which were stationed at Kyrrhos.6 With the obedience of his army reconfirmed the king himself undertook a campaign against Molon. The usurper faced serious problems. Being afraid of an open battle during daytime – because he thought there was some risk for a battle between a rebel and his sovereign, as Polybius (5.52.9) says – he planned an attack on Antiochus at night. But even at night some of his soldiers deserted to the king. When on the next day both armies met in an open battle, the left wing of Molon deserted completely – because (still according to Polybius) they faced the king. This quite detailed information needs some further differentiation. The Seleucid army was not a monolithic block. It consisted of military-settlers (katoikoi), mercenaries, subjects and allies.7 Each of these four groups had different interests and within each group there must have been differences as well. There are not enough details concerning the above mentioned armies of Antiochus III and Molon with regard to the ratio between the katoikoi, mercenaries, subjects and allies, but there are other armies or occasions that provide comparative figures. The relation between the four bodies fluctuated from time to time and, from occasion to occasion. The following numbers of the armies of Antiochus III at Raphia and Magnesia and the soldiers Antiochus IV present during a festival at Daphne for that reason are only a rough guideline.8 At Raphia the Seleucid army consisted of 68,000 soldiers of whom 12,500 were mercenaries, 10,000 allies and 9,500 subjects, the rest might have been katoikoi9 At Magnesia Antiochus conducted an army of more than 55,700 men, of which 10,700 were mercenaries, 4,500 allies and 15,200 subjects (7,000 recruited from territories just conquered some years ago).10 Antiochus’ IV army at Daphne included 55,980 soldiers of which 16,000 were mercenaries, 3,000 ≤ppeij politiko∂ and 1,000 other subjects.11 Even in Polyb. 5.43 (trans. W.R. Paton); on the authorship of these letters see Schmitt 1964: 125 (written by Molon). 5 Polyb. 5.46. 6 Polyb. 5.50. 7 For the question of recruitment see Bikerman 1938: 73–78; Bar-Kochva 1976: 20–53. 8 On the reliability of such figures see Bar-Kochva 1976: 7–19. 9 Polyb. 5.79; Bar-Kochva 1976: 51. 10 Liv. 37.40; Bar-Kochva 1976: 51–52. 11 Polyb. 30.25; Bar-Kochva 1976: 52. 4 Blood and Money. On the Loyalty of the Seleucid Army 49 these well documented cases there remain doubts about the origin and status of several detachments.12 Concerning Molon’s army the most important factor in terms of military strength were most probably his katoikoi. Bezalel Bar-Kochva believes that Molon could recruit about 22,000 of them.13 On the other hand his ability to recruit mercenaries must have been very limited because he had neither access to the Mediterranean Sea nor to Asia Minor, the islands, Greece or Macedonia from where most mercenaries normally came. The fact that the core of his army consisted of katoikoi, who were led by officers from the same origin, might explain the high degree of loyalty of these troops to Antiochus III whom they seem to have regarded as legitimate king.14 Antiochus III had only a limited number of katoikoi at his disposal because from the about 52,000 Seleucid katoikoi15 Molon controlled the above mentioned 22,000, an unknown number was used by Achaeus during his fight against the Attalids (see below) and the 6,000 Kyrrhestians revolted. For that reason, Antiochus III must have recruited quite a great number of mercenaries. Polybius does not give numbers but his account of Antiochus’ III army during his battle against Molon in the year 220 mentions allied Cretans, Galatians and Greek mercenaries apart from the katoikoi.16 These allies and mercenaries played an important role – but they were expensive. It is no surprise that the king was not able to pay his troops after his not very successful campaign against the Ptolemies. He might have hoped to finance the campaign with the help of booty. But the mercenaries were loyal to him again after their payment by Hermeias. Obviously for them, money was the most important factor of loyalty. This did not apply to the soldiers stationed at Kyrrhos who revolted after the payment by Hermeias. They were no mercenaries but katoikoi. Here we have one of the first well documented cases of severe problems of loyalty of the katoikoi. Not the shortness of money but quarrels within the royal court were the reason for their defection.17 The Kyrrhestians supported Epigenes, whose demission was a condition of his enemy Hermeias.18 If this is true the Khyrrhestians did not desert from Antiochus III alone or in the first place but from Hermeias as well, who was the most important person after the king at that moment. In 220, when Hermeias was killed, the Kyrrhestians were still not under the control of Antiochus III and Achaeus, a relative of Antiochus, who took the diadem in 221/0, tried to win the Kyrrhestians over to his side.19 Achaeus had been responsible for the war in Asia Minor which Seleucus III, the older brother and predecessor of Antiochus, had begun. For that reason Achaeus was in command of a large army. Relying on these soldiers (and possibly pressed by them) he declared himself king and started to move against Antiochus For example the origin of the Thracians, Galatians and Mysians presented at Daphne is disputed: Sekunda 1994: 16 and 18 believes the Mysians and Thracians were delivered by Eumenes II; Launey 1949: 443 f.; Walbank 1979: 449 f. and Sion-Jenkins 2001: 27 think the Mysians were military-settlers from within the Seleucid Empire. Launey 1949: 384 and Walbank 1979: 450 suppose the same is true for the Thracians – against this assumption of Bark-Kochva 1976: 52 and Sekunda 1994: 18. Launey 1949: 523 assumes that the Galatians were military settlers as well. 13 Bar-Kochva 1976: 18. 14 Bar-Kochva 1976: 85–93. 15 See on this number Bar-Kochva 1976: 19 and 20–47. 16 Polyb. 5.53. 17 Tarn 1928: 725; Schmitt 1964: 132 and 152. 18 Polyb. 5.50.5. 19 Polyb. 5.57.4. 12 50 PETER FRANZ MITTAG and to cross the Taurus. But his soldiers revolted when they realized that Achaeus wanted to fight against Antiochus, the hereditary king – as Polybius says.20 Here – as in the case of Molon’s troops – the soldiers sided with the king whom they thought to be the legitimate king (south of the Taurus). For Achaeus’ troops the fact that Achaeus was like Antiochus III a member of the royal house – he was probably a greatgrandson of Seleucus I and uncle of Antiochus III – counted less than the fact that Antiochus III was the brother of Seleucus III, the son of Seleucus II, the grandson of Antiochus II, the great-grandson of Antiochus I and the great-great-grandson of Seleucus I. Although there was no fixed hereditary rule and although Achaeus had much closer personal links to the soldiers under his command, Antiochus had, in the eyes of these soldiers, a better claim to be king (south of the Taurus) than Achaeus. It is obvious that, from the soldier’s point of view, the Taurus was a border. Achaeus had some problems to lead his soldiers against Antiochus, but he had no problems in respect of the obedience of his soldiers within the boundaries of Asia Minor (north of the Taurus). In this area he had been the representative of the Seleucid king since the death of Seleucus III. As such he was successful in the war with Attalus I and could regain the former Seleucid territories lost to Attalus.21 When he adopted the title of king he obviously was regarded only as king of Asia Minor by his soldiers. That was in so far a well known situation as since the time of Seleucus I members of the royal family were installed as sub-kings in parts of the huge Seleucid Empire.22 As long as he stayed in Asia Minor his soldiers were loyal. And even when Antiochus III besieged Achaeus in his residence at Sardes in 213, Achaeus’ troops stayed at his side and Antiochus had to use intrigues to get Achaeus into his hands.23 The wars of Antiochus III against Molon and Achaeus thus demonstrate the ties between the katoikoi and the royal house as well as the problems that are connected with the use of mercenaries. The most important aspect concerning the obedience of the katoikoi was the question of legitimacy which was linked to the question of the nearest family tie to the former king and the borders of the dominion. For the mercenaries the most important aspect seems to have been the question of payment. This is no surprise, but it is necessary to remember these aspects when looking at other episodes of Seleucid history. 2. Antiochus Hierax contra Seleucus II The war between Antiochus Hierax and his older brother Seleucus II is of great importance for our question. Unfortunately there are only traces left of the long-lasting war between them and just one aspect seems to be interesting and characteristic: Antiochus Hierax, who assumed power in Asia Minor (c. 242) after and in opposition to his older brother, relied to a considerable extent on Galatian mercenaries as well as the aid of allied kings and their troops. It seems to have been necessary for Hierax to use these non-Seleucid troops. However, we do not have any signs of tensions between Hierax and the katoikoi – he simply seems to have been unable to recruit enough of them for his purposes. Probably some of the katoikoi from Asia Minor joined Seleukos’ II army in the east. As in the case of Antiochus III this situation could be very dangerous when the mercenaries deserted. 20 21 Polyb. 5.57.6: œpπ tÕn kat¦ fÚsin aÙtîn œx ¢rcÁj Øp£rconta basil◊a. Polyb. 4.48. 22 App. Syr. 59 (Seleucus I appoints his son Antiochus king of upper Asia). 23 Polyb. 8.17 ff. Blood and Money. On the Loyalty of the Seleucid Army 51 Exactly that happened after the victorious battle of Hierax against Seleucus II near Ankyra – and here, as in the case of Antiochus III after his unsuccessful war against the Ptolemies, the only remedy was money.24 3. Demetrius II, Antiochus VI, Tryphon and Antiochus VII The events from the time of Demetrius II, Antiochus VI, Tryphon and Antiochus VII provide more and detailed evidence. Demetrius II (147–126) had difficulties with some of the Seleucid katoikoi. When Tryphon, one of the king’s friends, revolted, he was supported by the people who hated the ruling king Demetrius II25 and by troops Demetrius II had dismissed a short while before.26 Flavius Josephus says the king not only had dismissed the troops but also reduced their pay – only the mercenaries were kept and paid as before.27 These dismissed troops most probably were katoikoi. There must have existed good reasons for this unusual measure. No earlier Seleucid king tried to rely on mercenaries instead of katoikoi. The most plausible reason is that the regular Seleucid troops were no longer reliable. This development was due to the fact that since the death of Antiochus V in 162 there were two rival lines within the royal family: the descendants of Seleucus IV and the descendants of his younger brother Antiochus IV. The katoikoi now had similar problems as the soldiers of Achaeus some decades before. Which member of the royal house should they support? The problems started when Alexander Balas, the supposed son of Antiochus IV, was installed by Attalus II as opponent against Demetrius I in the year 152. Alexander Balas came from outside the Seleucid Empire and was supported by various Hellenistic kings and the revolting Jews.28 With their help he could defeat Demetrius I in 150.29 Although he pretended to be the son of Antiochus IV, he was not accepted by everyone. When Demetrius II, the son of Demetrius I, claimed the throne in 146 some of Alexander Balas’ soldiers deserted to Demetrius II because they still supported the family of Demetrius I.30 But Demetrius II himself could access to the throne only with the help of the Ptolemies – who had turned their back on Alexander Balas – and Cretan mercenaries.31 The troops Alexander Balas had at his disposal – most of all the katoikoi – were still numerous enough to check Demetrius. Especially these must have been the soldiers which were dismissed by Demetrius II after his victory – certainly because they still supported Alexander Balas.32 The katoikoi (and probably other troops) were divided between the two Seleucid houses. Demetrius II drew the logical conclusions by dismissing those troops that were not loyal to him. Iust. 27.2.11. Diod. 33.4a: Ðrîn t¦j Ðrm¦j tîn Ôclwn kaπ tÕ prÕj tÕn dun£sthn m√swj. 26 1 Macc. 11.38; Strab. 16.2.10 (752); Diod. 33.4a; Ios. ant. Iud. 13.131; Iust. 36.1.7; Oros. 5.4.18. 27 Ios. ant. Iud. 13.129. 28 Iust. 35.1.6; compare Polyb. 3.5.3; Diod. 33.20; App. Syr. 67; Porph. FGrH 260 F 32,14. 29 Ios. ant. Iud. 13.59; Iust. 35.1.8–11. 30 Iust. 35.2.3: sed et milites paterni fauore iuuenis accensi prioris sacramenti religionem noui regis superbiae praeferentes signa ad Demetrium transferunt. Alexander Balas could get access to the throne only with the help of Ptolemy VI: App. Syr. 67. At the end he sent his son Antiochus to the Arab sheikh Iamlichos (1 Macc. 11.39; Diod. 33.4a; Ios. ant. Iud. 13.131) who later became the ally of Tryphon. 31 1 Macc. 11.9–17; Diod. 32.9c; Liv. per. 52.11; Ios. ant. Iud. 13.109–116; Iust. 35.2.3. 32 Bar-Kochva 1976: 89 assumes Demetrius not only dismissed the troops but also allowed mercenaries to occupy leading positions. 25 24 52 PETER FRANZ MITTAG When Tryphon revolted a little later, he could rely on these dismissed troops. He enlisted them as new soldiers, first of all military settlers from the area of Apamea – like those from the Syrian Larissa who were “loyal allies to the royal line descended from Seleucus Nicator” as Diodorus Siculus states.33 Tryphon was born near Apamea34 and had, as a former general of Alexander Balas, excellent connections to the troops.35 Apamea was the most important military basis of the Seleucid Empire since the elephants and the greater part of the army were stationed there.36 Diodorus relates that Tryphon started a revolt and was joined by a large number of soldiers. But it is probable as well that the soldiers intended to desert Demetrius II and convinced Tryphon to lead them. However, it is important here that these soldiers stationed in the military heart of the Seleucid Empire – and as such the core of the Seleucid army – were not content with their ruling king. To secure his position Tryphon made an ally of the Arab sheikh Iamblichos,37 and – most importantly – he proclaimed Antiochus VI, a child of Alexander Balas and as such a presumed grandson of Antiochus IV, king in 145.38 The new king was just a child of about 2 years39 and he had lived for several months outside the Seleucid Empire. Tryphon himself was not of royal blood, so he used the son of Alexander Balas as a puppet king to secure the obedience of the katoikoi still loyal to this family. Without Antiochus VI on his side his further success might have been nearly impossible. The author of the first book of Maccabees says that after these events Demetrius II lost the backing of his troops and had to recruit 30,000 Jewish mercenaries.40 If this pro-Jewish report is true, in addition to the troops around Apamea other soldiers of Demetrius’ army deserted after the proclamation of Antiochus VI. Nothing could better demonstrate the difficulties Demetrius had in respect of the obedience of a great part of the Seleucid troops. But Demetrius II was even in greater danger. He not only had problems with the soldiers, he also was not on very good terms with the citizens of Antioch.41 Tryphon decisively defeated Demetrius II in about 144/3,42 entered Antioch and occupied most of Syria and Cilicia while Demetrius II was reduced to the Phoenician coast and the Seleucid east. In about 141 Antiochus VI died – officially after an unsuccessful operation – and Tryphon was proclaimed king by the troops.43 The official version of the boy-king’s death must not be explained as an attempt of Tryphon to style himself as successor of Antiochus VI.44 It is quite possible that this story is true. But even if this version was invented to hide the murder of Antiochus VI by Tryphon, the usurper didn’t style himself as legitimate successor of Antiochus VI but as the founder of a new empire. Diod. 33.4a.1 (trans. F.R. Walton). Strab. 16.2.10 (C 752). 35 1 Macc. 11.39; Ios. ant. Iud. 13.131. 36 Strab. 16.2.10 (C 752). 37 This sheikh might have been loyal to Alexander Balas who fled to the Arabs after the lost battle against Demetrius II but was murdered by the sheikh Sabdiël (1 Macc. 11.17). 38 Diod. 33.4a.1. 39 Liv. per. 52. 40 1 Macc. 11.43–4. 41 1 Macc. 11.45–51; Ios. Ant. Iud. 13.135–142. This was a burden inherited from his father. 42 On the date see Houghton 1992: 120 and 140. 43 1 Macc. 13.31; Strab. 16.2.10 (752); Liv. per. 55; Diod. 33.28; Ios. ant. Iud. 13.218; App. Syr. 68; Iust. 36.1.7; Oros. 5.4.18. On the role of the army during the proclamation of kings see Chaniotis 2005: 62–64 with further reading. On the date of Antiochus’ death see Ehling 2008: 178 f. 44 For this explanation see e.g. Fischer 1972: 208. 34 33 Blood and Money. On the Loyalty of the Seleucid Army 53 He did not only adopt the title basileus but created the new title basileus autokrator, started a new era and didn’t use the deities the Seleucid kings had preferred for the reverses of their coins, but a helmet and a wreath. The helmet combines elements of different parts of his army, which was the basis of his new kingdom. The helmet itself is a typical Boeotian helmet of the Seleucid cavalry,45 the horn was the horn of a Cretan goat and thus pointing to the Cretan mercenaries that were once recruited by Demetrius II and now might have formed a part of Tryphon’s army.46 Tetradrachm, 16,40 g, Houghton 256; Gorny und Mosch, auction 138, 7.3.2005, no. 153 Tryphon – as has just been stated – was not a member of the Seleucid house and it would have been very difficult for him to claim that then. He could have done it at the beginning of the revolt against Demetrius II – now it was too late. Another problem was that Demetrius II still controlled huge areas of the Seleucid Empire. A war between Tryphon and Demetrius II was not out of sight and it was quite uncertain how Tryphon’s soldiers would act when led against Demetrius II. It must have been a most welcome incident when Demetrius II was captured by Mithradates I in 140/139. The whole problem came up again sooner than Tryphon might have expected when Antiochus VII, the brother of Demetrius II, landed in Syria. At first everything worked quite well for Tryphon because no Seleucid city opened its gates to Antiochus VII.47 But when Cleopatra, the wife of Demetrius II, invited Antiochus VII “to come and marry her and take the throne”,48 the brother of Demetrius II could get hold in Syria. And at the moment when Antiochus VII attacked Tryphon most of the usurper’s soldiers changed sides and deserted to the newly arrived member of the Seleucid house.49 Once again blood counted. Tryphon had done his best and his starting point was excellent, but even the disturbed relationship between the Seleucids and the soldiers still worked. It would be interesting to know what would have happened if Tryphon had not murdered Antiochus VI (or, if the boy had not died after an operation). Diod. 33.4a says that Tryphon especially enlisted cavalry. Ehling 1997: 26. 47 The main reason for these tensions between a member of the Seleucid house and the Syrian cities was the behaviour of the Cretan mercenaries of Demetrius II. They had been a heavy burden for the Seleucid Empire. The citizens of Apamea played a major role in overthrowing them. 48 Ios. ant. Iud. 13.222 (trans. by R. Marcus). 49 1 Macc. 15.10–12. 46 45 54 PETER FRANZ MITTAG 4. Indirect hints Apart from the above mentioned direct hints to the close relationship between the Seleucid kings and their regular troops, there are some indirect clues as well. Polyainos reports that 3,000 Seleucid katoikoi were killed by Oborzos in the Persis because they planned an attack on him.50 The identification of this Oborzos and the date of the events are in dispute.51 But one thing seems to be uncontested: Oborzos was a local priest with political and military responsibilities (frataraka). The frataraka seem to have tried to get rid of the Seleucid supremacy and the story told by Polyainos would fit very well into this situation. The killing of the 3,000 katoikoi could be explained by their strong feelings for the Seleucid house – and not for their commander(?) Oborzos. Another example derives from the far-east of the Seleucid Empire. Diodotus, the satrap of Bactria, aspired to achieve political freedom in the 240s.52 At about the same time the Parthians occupied northern Parthia and the Seleucid king Antiochus II had no possibility of preventing the uprising of Diodotus. Nevertheless Diodotus abstained from using the title of king and still coined in the name of Antiochus II.53 It is extremely uncommon for an usurper not to coin in his own name. Gold and silver coins were primarily produced for paying soldiers54 and probably the precious coins in the name of Antiochus II were meant to pay the (former) Seleucid troops. Diodotus I respected their feelings for the royal house and paid them with “Seleucid” coins. But when Antiochus III came to Bactria about forty years later, during his anabasis, the ties between the “Bactrian” katoikoi and the Seleucid house were cut. The Bactrian king now commanded an army of soldiers of a new generation. None of them had fought under a Seleucid king and they all felt loyal to the Bactrian king. There are also a few cases that provide some information concerning the question of the loyalty of the subjects who formed part of the Seleucid armies as well. When Ptolemy III conquered central parts of the Seleucid Empire during the Laodice-war he pretended to act in the name of Berenice, the wife of Antiochus II.55 He most probably needed this trick to get the obedience of huge parts of the Seleucid subjects and officials. He was quite successful until he reached Babylon. The citizens and the Seleucid garrison did not surrender because they accepted Seleucus II, the son of Antiochus II, as legitimate king and regarded Ptolemy III as a foreigner.56 Although Seleucus II was in Asia Minor and Ptolemy III stood at the doors of Babylon with a large army the city did resist. A further case of loyalty of the Mesopotamian cities to the house of Seleucus dates from the time of the wars of Demetrius II and Antiochus VII against the Parthians. The Greeks and Macedonians living in that region had sent envoys to Demetrius II promising to join him if he invaded Mesopotamia57 and the Mesopotamian cities that had been conquered by the Polyain. 7.40. See Mittag 2006: 314 n. 83. 52 Iust. 41.4.5. 53 Kritt 2001: 11 believes that all coins with the portrait of Diodotus I were produced after his death and by his son Diodotus II. 54 See e.g. de Callataÿ 2000: 337–364. 55 FGrH 160 F 1 col. IV. 56 BM 34428 = BCHP 11 rev. 6’: Ptolemy III as king of Meluh¤h¤a; compare AD–245 A rev. 5’–6’ (recognition of Seleucus II in Babylon), see Dreyer 2007: 304 n. 300. 57 Ios. ant. Iud. 13.185. 1 Macc. 14.1 says Demetrius II wanted to recruit soldiers in Mesopotamia for his fight against Tryphon. If this assumption is correct, it must have been mostly ex-Seleucid katoikoi. The 51 50 Blood and Money. On the Loyalty of the Seleucid Army 55 Parthians opened their gates to Demetrius II and Antiochus VII when they arrived in that area during their wars against Mithradates I and Phraates II.58 Not only the preceding military successes of the Seleucid kings but also the ties between the indigenous cities and the katoikoi still living in Mesopotamia and the Seleucids seem to have been an important factor during these events. Mithradates I, who captured Demetrius II, tried to solve this problem to the stability of his rule. He forced the captured Seleucid king to marry Rhodogune, one of Mithradates’ daughters, and presented the captive to the former Seleucid cities.59 In addition he styled himself as philhellēn.60 But these measures could not prevent the cities from welcoming Antiochus VII during his campaigns in that area in 130. 5. Summary The few sources on the composition and obedience of the Seleucid armies reveal that the katoikoi supported the Seleucid house to a very high degree. Usurpers had to face serious problems when fighting kings that were members of the Seleucid house. The same applies more or less to the subjects, especially to the citizens of Seleucid towns. The mercenaries, on the other hand, were most of all interested in cash. Things changed during the decades following the death of Antiochus V when members of two lines of the Seleucid house fought each other. The katoikoi and other subjects seem to have been divided between Demetrius I or his children and Alexander Balas or Antiochus VI. This division did not count for the mercenaries. When a legitimate king couldn’t pay he had to face serious problems with his mercenaries – when a usurper paid, they fought without questioning their obedience. Tryphon tried to create a new kingdom to cut the close links between the katoikoi and the Seleucid house, but he failed. The Bactrian kings, on the other hand, were successful because the Seleucids were not strong enough to subdue their revolt at the beginning. When Antiochus III tried to do that, about forty years later, during his anabasis, it was too late; the former Seleucid katoikoi now had much closer ties to the Bactrian kings. letters Josephus mentions would indicate the still existing ties between these katoikoi and the Seleucid house. Demetrius II was supported by allies from the Persis, Elymais and Bactria (Iust. 36.1.4). But these allies didn’t join Demetrius II because he was a Seleucid but because he fought against the Parthians. 58 Iust. 36.1.2 and 38.10.6. 59 Iust. 38.9.3, App. Syr. 67.356; see as well Dąbrowa 1992: 47 and Mittag 2002: 382 f. 60 See Dąbrowa 1998: 35–44. 56 PETER FRANZ MITTAG BIBLIOGRAPHY Bar-Kochva, B. (1976): The Seleucid Army. Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, Cambridge. Bikerman, E. (1938): Institutions des Séleucides, Paris. de Callataÿ, F. 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